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Introduction 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands has one of the oldest written constitutions in 
Europe. 1 It rode the crest of the first wave of post-revolutionary constitutions in 
Western Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Dutch Consti-
tution dates back to 1814, with a first major revision in 1815 when what is uow 
Belgium joined the Kingdom of the Netherlands following the Allied Congress of 
Vienna. The document is restorative in nature as well as post-revolutionary 
(Napoleonic), a typical example of the first wave of liberal constitutions in the 
West.Z The Dutch Constitution of 1814 did not (and does not) have a preamble, 3 
only a very limited list of fundamental rights, an institutional design based on the 
ideal division of powers (a checked and balanced legislative branch, a distinct 
executive, and an independent judiciary), an embryonic parliamentary system, 
and a firmly enshrined system of constitutional monarchy. 4 The restorative 
elements are to be found in the restored powers of self-government of municipalities 
and provinces, and the freedom of religion and conscience. 
From the start in 1814, the Dutch Constitution has had a very rigid regime for 
constitutional revision. Article 142, through Art. 144 of the 1814 version, required 
a statute expressing that there was a need to amend (parts of) the Constitution and 
then a subsequent second reading, beginning with the convention of adjunct 
Members of Parliament (MPs) recruited from the Provinces (doubling the number 
of MPs--the "States General") to consider the proposal put forward by the statute. 
"" Only a two-thirds ril<tjority in this enlarged Parliament could then adopt and pass 
the amendment: a formidable double threshold indeed in a country famous for its 
many denominations, creeds, and factions. 5 There is no real explanatory note with 
the original Constitution so one can only speculate as to the reasons the founding 
fathers may have had to come up with a revision procedure like this one. It may 
have been to do with the experience of the volatile political situation at the end of 
the eighteenth century when, after the original Patriotic insurrection had been 
quashed,6 the Batavian Republic was proclaimed in 1795 as the outcome of 
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another popular revolution.l This revolution was brought about with the support 
of the French revolutionary army who invaded the Netherlands, at intervals, 
between 1793 and 1795. The end result of the French intervention was that, after 
a series of domestic coups, the Batavian Republic became a client state of France. 
After 1806, the Republic turned into a monarchy (Kingdom of Holland) under 
direct French rule, which in 1810 became part of the French Empire. Thorbecke, 
on the other hand, points out that Van Hogendorp, principal framer of the original 
Constitution of 1814, believed that a constitution that could not be revised was 
flawed. Actually, Van Hogendorp got the inspiration for the revision procedure, 
Thorbecke's notes, from an annex to the Batavian Constitution of 1798.8 
This contribution will deal with the constitutional revision procedure in the 
Netherlands as such, but will also consider the wider perspective of the rela-
tive position of the Dutch revision procedure amidst other types of revision 
procedures, and will also discuss the effects of this kind of revision procedure and 
recent proposals to amend the revision procedure. To my mind, this wider 
perspective is needed if we want to be able to compare revision procedures in 
different jurisdictions. 
Shapes and sizes of revision procedures: an 
overview to set the stage9 
Constitutional revision: balancing flexibility and rigidity-
+J.a,...,.,.., n-d ...,....,,.,,.t;,.o 
...... "" ...... ..}' -·-- _, ........... '""-'""-' 
One of the classical problems of constitutional law all over the world concerns 
constitutional revision. Modern constitutions are believed to express the political 
will of a people as regards the conditions and terms for political society. The 
received theory in our day and age is that a constitution is a consensual act by a 
sovereign nation or people empowered to do so10 (a so-called constituante), rest1lting 
in one or more 11 written documents.l2 The rationale behind this theory is that of 
a temporary (mythical13) communion of individuals with different interests into 
one body with a common identity (nation or people) at a single moment, reimlting 
in a balanced packaged deal. Most modern constitutions are based on this 
underlying notion of what I will call constitutional singularity. According to this 
theory, the revision of a constitution by a different body ·other than the constituante 
itself is problematic, and even then, revision is controversial because the constituante 
is not a mere body-it is an historic moment as well. 14 That may be the reason why 
they have annexed amendments to their Constitution...in the United States rather 
than changing the original text itsel£ The revision of a constitution is not only 
problematic from the perspective of constitutional singularity, it may also 
compromise the balance and trade-offs in the package deal of the constitution 
itsel£ Modern contract theorists and political economists alike have pointed ont 
that amendments or revisions to the original package deal of the constitution may 
render a post-constitutional state unstable, even reverting to anarchy, if rights in 
nractice cam<e to rliv~enre substantiallv from neonle's "reneQ'otiation exnectation.s_." 15 
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Compared to the theories on constitution-making, there are virtually no theories 
on constitutional revision (apart from it being considered problematic). 16 What is 
the rationale or the justification for constitutional revision? According to one line 
of thought, it is not possible for a constituante to foresee everything, and therefore 
the work of this body is unfinished, or at least not perfected. Future legislators are 
therefore delegated by the constituante to finish the job and to perfect the constitution, 
within-of course-the confines of the mandate laid down by the constituante. 17 
A second line is based on Fukuyama's theory of adaptation: political institutions 
need to adapt to changing circumstances in order to survive. 1B Constitutions as 
platforms and frames for political life need to adapt in order to keep the original 
will of the constituante intact. 
Once we are clear on the wiry of constitutional revision, the question of how to 
revise presents itself. If a constitution is over-adaptive, it may risk compromising 
the original (package) deal and constitutional consensus (thus becoming futile as a 
constitution). On the other hand, too much rigidity may fossilize the constitution, 
or (as a result) trigger forms of bypass 19 or non-compliance. Balancing rigidity and 
flexibility (i.e. adaptation) is of course a question for political actors and not a 
theoretical consideration, although Cooter's "Minimax Constitution" strategy 
(originating from game theory), 20 in wlrich a constitution and its revision procedure 
are set up in such a way that they minimize the harm when the worst political 
possibilities materialize, seems to explain the bulk of constitutional revision 
procedures in democracies. 
Revision types 
Most written constitutions in the world, to which I will limit my treatise, are equipped 
with revision procedures. 21 Classical constitutional doctrine makes a distinction 
between two types of constitutions based on the ease of a revision. Rigid cons-
titutions are, according to this distinction, constitutions that are difficult to revise 
(e.g. because of a complex or difficult amendment procedure involving more than 
one reading, or qualified majorities or supermajorities ), whereas flexible constitutioru 
can be amended more easily. 22 This distinction, however, is confusing to a certain 
extent. First of all, because most of the many constitutions we regard as "flexible" 
in terms of their amendment procedure do set extra requirements on constitutional 
amendments compared with ordinary statutes, for example. 23 Even in countries 
where the fundamental constitutional rules are not enshrined in a single 
constitutional document, but in mere Acts of Parliament, for example, there is 
usually a certain degree of rigidity due to de focto respect for-these parts of their 
Constitutions.· For example, it is almost inconceivable that the Westminster 
Parliament would amend the Bill of Rights of 1688. 
Moreover, the rigidity of a constitution involves more than the mere revision 
procedure. The rigidity of a constitution also reflects its fundamental nature.24 
This is in fact what distinguishes constitutions from ordinary statutes. Hans Kelsen 
already understood that a constitution that can be amended in the same way as 
anv other statute results in a curious paradox. This constitution would be a 
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constitution only in naJile, because any "unconstitutional" statute would, as a 
result of the operation of the maxim lex posterior ·derogat priori, lead to a change in 
the constitution, at least in terms of the sphere of validity of this statute. 25 Some 
jurisdictions, like India for instance, have expressed this by acknowledging that 
there are elements in their constitution that make up the "basic structure" of the 
document and, therefore, cannot be amended according to the normal (up to 1976 
very flexible) revision procedure. 26 
A constitution may also impose different levels of aJilendability on different 
subject matter. The German Constitution, for instance, is famous for its 
Ewigkeitsklausel (eternity clause), which prohibits the amendment of the fundamental 
principles enshrined in Art. l and Art. 20 of the Constitution, and the division of 
powers between states and the federation. 27 Other countries have differing revision 
regimes for different subject matter/provisions in their constitutions.28 
Constitutions can be rigid not only in terms of their amendment procedure but 
also in terms of their enforcement. Merryman and Perez-Perdomo draw an illu-
minating distinction between formally rigid constitutions, which specifY limitations 
on legislative power and define special requirements for constitutional amend-
ments (but make no provision for enforcing these rules) on the one hand, and 
functionally rigid constitutions, in which an organ (court, council) can review-· -in 
one way or another-the constitutionality of legislative action on the other hand. 29 
This functional rigidity also reflects the fundamental nature of a constitution.· 
More or less "rigid" revision procedures come in a wide variety of shapes and 
sizes. Procedural revision rigidity seems, however, to be the most common type. 30 
Most of the time, qualified or supermajorities are required before an amendment 
to the constitution can be adopted, or there are procedural extras like a double 
parliamentary reading, new elections between the readings (e.g. the Netherlands), 
parliamentary enactment followed by a referendum (e.g. France), and adoption by 
Parliament and ratification by (a qualified majority of) territorial subunits (USA). 
Heringa and Kiiver note that the formal rigidity of a constitution (the procecfures) 
is not always a clear indicator of its substantive rigidity.31 Changing customs and 
conventions in political practice may give, for instance, a different meaning 
to constitutional provisions. In the same way; judicial interpretation-notably that 
of constitutional courts-can play a crucial role in determining the substantial 
flexibility of a constitutional text. 
The overview of revision types presented above is more or less classic textqook 
material. Recent literature seems to focus more on the actual ways constitutions 
are amended. A distinction between formal and informal revisions of constitutions 
then emerges. Formal revisions are, in this line of thinki.Rg, changes to a constitu-
tion brought about by aJilendments to the text of the entrenched written constitu-
tion, which have passed through a special procedure (that may include a qualified 
majority in Parliament or a referendum), or brought about by other written acts 
that can be regarded as of a fundamental nature. 32 Informal revisions, on the other 
hand, are changes made to the constitution (or impacts on it that yield the same 
result as change) that have not followed the path of the formal amendment proce-
dure. Constitutional interpretation bv courts. for instance. mav !have the effect of) 
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change the constitution, as may legislation or international treaties. On occasion, 
modern constitutional theory labels formal textual changes to a written constitu-
tion as "amendments" and informal changes as "revisions."33 Donald Lutz has 
come across an interesting pattern while studying di!Terent amendment pro-
cesses. He observes that in jurisdictions where it is "too difficult" (according to his 
Index of Difficulty) to formally amend the constitution, those jurisdictions will 
develop alternatives, including amendment by purported interpretation. 34 
The Dutch revision procedure 
Chapter 8 of the Dutch Constitution deals with the revision procedure. In view of 
the procedural requirements it sets on revision, the Dutch Constitution qualifies as 
a rigid constitution. Any revision to the Constitution involves two parliamentary 
readings (with general elections in between), and a qualified two-thirds majority in 
both Houses of Parliament in the second reading. 
There are different triggers for proposals for constitutional revision in the 
Netherlands. Proposals for relatively small amendments are commonly the result 
of incidents or the specific program of a political party. Major revision proposals 
are mostly preceded by studies and proposals by specially established government 
committees, although this is not mandatory. The role of experts is quite small. 
Proposals for revision are, almost always as a rule, 35 prepared by one or more 
ministerial departments. 36 The required skill and expertise is pooled within a 
special unit of the Ministry of the Interior. The Bureau of Constitutional Affairs 
and Legislation ( Constitutionele :(_aken en Wetgevil(g, or CZW fur short) has a regular 
staff of a dozen expert civil servants who look into constitutional affairs. This 
central unit within government is consulted on constitutional issues that arise in 
the different ministerial departments; when it comes down to constitutional 
revision, this unit is responsible for drafting the proposals. Once a proposal is made 
by the Minister of the Interior, it needs to be discussed and agreed by the Council 
of Ministers: major legislation is a collegiate matter in the Dutch political system. 
After clearance by the Council of :Ministers, the proposal is sent to the Council of 
State for consultation. The consultation must not be confused with judicial review 
of amendments as we know it in other constitutional systems (e.g. France or Italy). 
The Dutch Council of State gives a non-binding opinion; no more, no less. The 
Council of State's opinion is discussed in the Cabinet, and a subsequent report 
reacting to this opinion is added to the dossier (nader rapport). The proposal, the 
explanatory memorandum, the opinion of the Council of State, and the additional 
report with comments are then tabled before the Dutch RollS€ of Representatives 
(Tweede Kamer), the Dutch variant of a House of Commons in its bicameral 
Parliament (Staten-Generaa~. The Houses at this stage deal with the bill proposing 
to amend the Constitution in a first reading. Since the bill after its first reading does 
not, in fact, amount to a constitutional revision (a subsequent second reading is 
necessary), we call this sort of first-reading bill a "consideration proposal" after the 
text of Art. 13 7 para 1 of the Dutch Constitution, which provides that a revision 
of the Constitution starts with the oassa2"e of a bill "statin2" that an amendment to 
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the Constitution in the form proposed shall be considered." The consideration bill 
is debated as a regular bill in the first reading in the House of Representatives. 
Amendments can be made to it, and it is subject to regular voting procedures (i.e. 
a simple majority suffices for adoption). However, in most cases, constitutional 
revision in the Netherlands is an uphill battle. 
Constitutional amendments tend to touch on principles, and the Dutch have a 
tradition going back more than 400 years of discussing (and most of the time 
disagreeing) on principles at length. This has resulted in a fragmented religious37 
and political landscape. 38 Political and ideological fragmentation combined with .a. 
rigid revision procedure has made it very difficult to amend the Constitution. It 
proved equally difficult to amend the revision procedure itsel£ A major revision to 
the Constitution in 1983, however, brought one innovation that tried to mak:e 
constitutional amendment somewhat easier. Article 13 7 para 2 of the Constitution 
makes it possible to break up a bill proposing to amend the Constitution, which in 
turn makes it possible to save and readily pass uncontroversial parts of a proposal 
as a separate bill. Only the Government and the House of Representatives have 
this power to divide a first-reading consideration bill, not the Senate. After the 
House of Representatives has adopted the bill (the first reading stops upon 
rejection), it is tabled before the Dutch Senate, the other Chamber of Parliament. 
Under the Dutch Constitution, the Senate does not have the power to amend or 
break up the bill in its first reading. The senators have to deal with the bill ash 
stands, but they can try to persuade the Government to use its powers to alter or 
divide the proposals put forward in the bill. If the Government succumbs to this, 
an alteration or division has to travel the whole route again (Council of State and 
House of Representatives), before it can be dealt with again within the Senate. 
This method of "novella" to rally support in the Dutch Senate is controversii!l 
because, in the eyes of some, it is an extra-constitutional usurpation of the power 
to amend. 39 If the consideration bill is passed by the Senate, it becomes an Act,of 
Parliament.40 
When the Act becomes effective, by way of publication, Art. 137 para 3 of the 
Dutch Constitution provides that both Houses of Parliament have to be dissolved. 
The underlying idea is that of a plebiscite: the people need to be consulted on the 
proposed amendment. By ordering new elections, people can make np their mifid 
as regards the proposed amendments and vote for the candidates who voice the 
position on the proposed amendment they prefer. This plebiscite theory ha:s,' 
however, been overhauled by the actual practice of the dissolutions for reason of 
constitutional amendment. The general practice throughout the last centu-qr~s6 
has been to wait for the moment of the general election for the House of 
Representatives and only then to publish the Act putting forward the proposal to 
amend the Constitution. In this way, general elections and public consideration of 
the proposal to amend the Constitution can coincide. As we will see in the next 
pamgraph, this method has resulted in the common practice that the general 
election totally overshadows the debate on pending proposals to amend the 
Constitution. The majority of voters are unaware of constitutional amendments 
...:! •• _;_~ o.-1-...,. ...,...,._,..,....,...,.1 ..,.1.,...-.+-":....,.....,.co 41 
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After a series of changes in the way the Senate was elected and composed in the 
latter half of the twentieth century; the dissolution of both Houses of Parliament 
for the purpose of constitutional reform created problems. Because the members 
of the Senate are indirectly elected by representatives of the provinces, and 
(thereby) the terms of the House of Representatives and the Senate were no longer 
synchronous, even minor constitutional amendments could trigger mid-term 
provincial elections. This is indeed a very drastic consequence, and it is why the 
1995 Act revised the dissolution procedure somewhat: only the House of 
Representatives has to be dissolved in the event of an Act proposing an amendment 
to the Constitution. +2 
After the election, the House of Representatives in its new composition convenes 
and considers the Act to amend the Constitution laid before it by the former 
session. The Houses of Parliament can no longer amend or divide this proposal 
during the second reading. The motion to amend the Constitution as put forward 
in the Act can only be carried if adopted in both Houses with a two-thirds majority 
of the votes cast. This way of conducting a second reading has proven to be a 
"killing field" for many proposed amendments, as one might imagine. The 
procedure gives 26 senators with a very indirect popular mandate the power to 
block any proposal. 
If the proposal is adopted in second reading, it has, once again, to be ratified by 
the Government before it can come into force. Constitutional revisions, however, 
do not usually take immediate effect.13 The amendments made to the Constitution 
may conflict with existing law, and, although Art. 140 of the Constitution enshrines 
a general transitory regime providing that existing legislation in conflict with an 
amendment to the Constitution remains in force until provisions are made in 
accordance with the Constitution (a form of deferred application), the Government 
generally tends not to let it come to this. Existing legislation is quite often tailored 
to the new constitutional amendments before the amendments themselves take 
effect. Constitutional amendments are promulgated by Royal Decree. 
Processes and practices of constitutional revision in 
the Netherlands: past and present 
Looking superficially at its history, one would not immediately conclude t.':!at the 
Dutch Constitution is very difficult to revise. Since its inception in 1814, there have 
been 23 revisions44 to the Constitution. These revisions were not all equally impor-
tant. Some are major in the volume of amendments (1848,45 1887,46 198347) or 
major considering the political or constitutional impact of the au;tendments (1848"~8 , 
191749 and, arguably,50 the ones of 195651 and 1983-12). The bulk of the amend-
ments, however, represents minor changes and largely stem from the last 75 years. 53 
The nature of the revisions has changed over time as well, as Burkens notes. In 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, debates on constitutional revisioru; 
were at the very heart of the political arena, and amendments to the Constitution 
acted as autonomous drivers for political change. After the major revision of 191 7, 
which solved the stalemate debate over universal suffrage and equal treatment of 
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public and private schools, there has been a tendency to leave the Constitution 
intact and only revise it after the political settlement of an issue. This is a 
transgression, in other words, from the Constitution as a driver of political change 
into a consolidating mechanism of political change after the fact. 54 
What has caused this deflation in the importance of constitutional revision in 
the Netherlands? There are two main explanatory perspectives here, e1qxessing 
two different lines of thought. One group of commentators looks for the causes 
within the Constitution itsel£ They feel that the combination of the partial ban on 
constitutional review (Art. 120 of the Constitution); the nature of the constitutional 
provisions themselves;55 the internationalization of human rights protection oyer 
the last 50 years, combined with the custom of submitting proposed amendments 
to the voters on the occasion of general elections (when the amendments get 
overcast by other political questions); and the rigid revision procedure have led to 
a steady decrease in the normativity of the Constitution, bordering on constitutional 
paralysis. 56 In 2006, the Dutch National Convention (a commission invited to 
reflect on constitutional and political modernization and reform) concluded that, 
if the Constitution is desired to be a "living instrument," the revision procedure 
and practice need to be reconsideredP 
Other commentators are less pessimistic and point out that the sober Dt<tbh 
Constitution aligns well with the present political culture that the revision procedure 
is doing what it ought to do: protecting against whimsical change, protecting 
minority rights and the constitutional structure against chance majorities, and 
creating and maintaining political stability.58 In this same vein, the most recent 
Dutch Governrnent Commission on Constitutional Reform held that, at pres-ent, 
there is no real pressing need for constitutional revision to uphold the ConstitutiQ!l:19 
Apparently, on the face of it, the Dutch seem content with their Constitution 
and the revision procedure. There is, however, somewhat more than meets the eye 
here, one could argue. First of all, the line of reasoning is a son; of conservapve, 
self-fulfilling prophecy: the Dutch Constitution is not a living instrument, it is not 
critical for the political order, nor in any danger, so we are content with a procedure 
that effectively blocks change. Second, due to the complex revision procedure, a 
lot of constitutional settlements and regulation have taken place outside /the 
Constitution itsei£ I have labeled this "covert constitution building."BD This form 
of extra-constitutional settlement of issues is not unique to the Netherlands, but 
perhaps the volume is. In the Netherlands, some of the principal constitutiopal 
norms are largely unwritten (the rule of confidence governing the relationship 
between Parliament and Government, the principle of the rule of law, and the 
principles of legality, legal security, etc.). A lot of norms that curb present-day 
government action are not enshrined in the Constitution but in lower-ranking Acts 
of Parliament like the important General Administrative Law Act and the Act on 
the organization of the Judiciary. Acts of Parliament have been t,'Je instrument of 
choice for constitutional innovations and experiments, such as nationwide 
referenda, 61 over the past few decades. The long and winding road of constitutional 
revision has been deliberately evaded over the last 30 years. Only when an issue 
cannot be settled without compromising existing constitutional provisions or 
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reserves62 is the royal route of revision considered, but circumventing it seems to 
be preferred. 63 
Assessing the Dutch revision procedure 
and processes 
In his book "Patterns of Democracy," Arend Lijphart discusses two important 
variables that have to do with the presence or absence of explicit restraints on the 
legislative power of parliamentary majorities:6'1 first, the presence of a (rigid or 
flexible) constitution, and second, judicial review. The combination of the two 
variables characterizes the democratic system of a country, In the pure consensus 
model, a constitution is rigid (requiring supermajorities for amendments) and pro-
tected by judicial review. In the pure majoritarian model, a constitution is flexible 
and there is no system of judicial constitutional review. Analyzing 36 democracies 
between 1945 and 1996, Lijphart has found an empirical relationship between the 
two variables. The correlation co-efficient is 0.39-not exceptionally strong, in his 
view, but still statistically significant at the I percent level.65 
Every Dutchman (including Lijphart, who is Dutch) would be suspicious of, or 
surprised by, a result that rates the country at the bottom of the league of 
majoritarian systems. Indeed, the Dutch constitutional system has-as discussed 
above-a ban on constitutional review of Acts of Parliament and Treaties (Art. 
120 Constitution), and a rigid Constitution, but domestic observers would all stress 
the fact that the Dutch democratic system is an outstanding example of a true 
consensus democracy (which, by the w-ay, is something a little different than a 
consensual system). Maybe this counter-intuitive outcome is (one of) the reason(s) 
why Lijphart concludes that the Netherlands present a deviant case as concerns this 
correlation. 
The interplay between the variables combined with Dutch political culture is, 
however, to a high degree explanatory for the Dutch system. And the Netherlands 
do rate as a consensual system, if we take a closer look. We already saw that the 
Dutch Constitution is a rigid constitution. Any amendment needs to pass through 
two different Houses of Parliament, in two readings, with a plebiscite in between. 
Lijphart places the amendment procedure in the middle category of rigidity, 
among those requiring a two-thirds majority, Actually, the Netherlands could be 
placed in the highest category of rigidity that Lijphart adopts, among those requir-
ing more than a two-thirds majority, The Dutch political system, for instance, has 
been highly fragmented for more than a century and was polarized until 30 years 
ago, which has resulted in a strong consensus culture. Political IPinorities do punch 
above their nominal electoral weight in everyday Dutch politics, due to this 
engrained culture of consensus and respect for minorities. There is even an official 
word for this consensus culture: poldmn. 66 The flip-side of this culture is that a 
mere two-thirds majority in itself will not suffice for a constitutional amendment. 
This explains why the major revisions of the Dutch Constitution have been the 
result of significant trade-offs in package-deal amendments after decades of polit-
ical discussion on the issue. It also explains why major constitutional innovations 
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only succeed if there is a near total consensus. And it explains why most of the 
recent revisions concerned minor details of little importance: they were utterly 
non-controversial, and could therefore rely on (near) total consensus. 
Consensus systems couple the rigidity of their constitution with judicial review, 
according to Lijphart's theory. The Dutch system, on the face of it, does not have 
judicial constitutional review. There is, however, more than meets the eye here. 
The ban on constitutional review enshrined in Art. 120 of the Constitution is only 
a partial one. Dutch courts are not allowed to review Acts of Parliaments and 
Treaties on their constitutionality, but they are free to review any other regulation. 
On the other hand, however, Dutch courts are allowed to review all domestic 
legislation~Acts of Parliament included~as to their compatibility with interna-
tional Treaties and European Union (EU) law, and they do so very actively and 
frequently. The human rights catalogue of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and its protocols, which has direct effect and is directly applicable 
in the Netherlands, is invoked and applied frequently; actually, Dutch judges seem 
to favor the European catalogue over the constitutional domestic catalogue. 
It would be no exaggeration to say that~especially in view of the, normatively, 
relatively "weak" Dutch Constitution~the actual Dutch Constitution is com-
prised of the ECHR and EU Treaties as well. The Dutch Constitution presents a 
textbook example of a compound constitution. If we look through this lens, there 
is actually more judicial review, even constitutional review, in the Netherlands than · 
meets the eye at first glance. And if we accept this, the Netherlands case woulcl 
nowadays move towards a consensual-type system in Lijphart's characterization·, 
rather than a more or less majoritarian system. 
Revising the revision procedure: recent attempts 
Is the Dutch revision procedure too rigid? Who is to say? The paradox, of course, 
is that the revision procedure itself is very difficult to change due to the rigidity of 
that very revision procedure. There have been initiatives to that end, though. ln · 
1946, the Bee] Cabinet proposed to elect a separate body for the second reading. · ..
It was believed that, with a dedicated Chamber for Constitutional Revision, the 
problem of general elections overshadowing the second reading of constitutionil 
revision could be overcome. The House of Representatives, however, rejected the 
proposal during the second reading. In 1951, the Cabinet considered a reprisal 
of the idea of a dedicated Constitutional Revision Chamber, but the propos:;!! · 
was \V-ithdrawn at the first reading when it became clear that there was no major-
ity to be found. In 1971, the influential Government Commission Gals/Donner, 
which came up with many of the proposals that found their way into the 1983 
revision, floated the idea of a combined session of both Chambers of Parliament 
on the occasion of the second reading. The suggestion did not make it to an actual 
proposal. 
A recent suggestion referred to above was put fof\Vard by the Nation.al 
Convention of 2006. During the first reading, the Convention proposed, the bill · 
with the proposals for amendment to the Constitution should be debated in both 
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the House of Representatives and the Senate, with the requirement of a two-thirds 
majority in both Houses. Upon adoption in both Houses, the Chambers would be 
dissolved and the proposed amendments then put up for a referendum, separate 
from the general election. If the proposal was adopted after the referendum, the 
Government would then ratify it, and thus it could come into effect. The suggestion 
was short-lived, however, and never made it to an actual proposal. 
In conclusion, one might say that, in ;~ew of recent Dutch constitutional history, 
the chances for successful revision of the revision procedure seem very slim indeed. 
Conclusion 
The Dutch Constitution is equipped with a rigid revision procedure that has more 
or less withstood the test of time for over !50 years. The procedure involves two 
readings in the two Houses of the Dutch Parliament, with dissolution of the House 
of Representatives in between, in order to consult the electorate on the proposed 
changes. In the second reading, after the election, a proposal needs to collect a 
two-thirds majority in both Houses to be adopted. 
Although the revision procedure seemed a formidable threshold at the outset, it 
has permitted 2 3 revisions in nearly 200 years, which amounts to more than one 
every decade. The nature of the revisions, however, has changed over time. 
Whereas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, constitutional revisions 
were debated at the heart of the political arena and the revisions themselves were 
triggers of political change, the revisions of the last century followed and consoli-
dated political change rather than spurring it on. 
It is not easy to assess the effects of the Dutch revision procedure itself, since 
it is so intertwined with the political and constitutional culture. Causalities are 
difficult to define. Has the rigidity of the Dutch revision procedure caused a polit-
ical culture that does not seem to overvalue the Constitution, or is it the other way 
around? If we try to assess the Dutch revision procedure in terms of effects, we 
can distinguish two different patterns. On the one hand, one might say that the 
rev~sion procedure has been successful in protecting the basic constitutional struc-
ture against whimsical change of chance majorities. It has-in the eyes of many 
observers-created a level of political stability in a historically fragmented political 
landscape governed as a rule by essentially frail coalitions. Playing it down, espe-
cially on constitutional principle, seems to have paid off, with stability being the 
dividend. The revision procedure can also be perceived as successful due to its 
persistence: attempts or suggestions to revise the Dutch constitutional revision pro-
cedure seem to have a lot of trouble getting off the drawing board. Those that did 
have failed. 
On the other hand, one might argue that the revision procedure suffocates the 
Dutch constitutional debate and paralyzes the Constitution as a living instrument. 
Evidence for this line of reasoning can be found in the lukewarm sympathy the 
Dutch have for their Constitution (if they know it at all), and their inclination to 
bypass the Constitution for constitutional change in the last decades. But then 
a!Iain. on a brighter note. one mi!Iht ar211e that the Dutch nolitical svstem in recent 
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years has produced a revision procedure that already exists in other systems: a two" 
tiered revision procedure according to which changes to the constitutional core are 
governed by rigid revision procedures with supermajority requirements, and 
subsequent readings and run-of-the-mill adaptations that can be made by simple 
majorities in regular parliamentary Acts. But perhaps this perception is much too 
apologetic and conciliatory, because, from whatever angle we look at it, the Dutch 
constituante was never consulted on it. 
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6 With the aid of a foreign power - the Prussians. The Patriotic insurrection (or even 
"revolution") and its background have been depicted in an unparalleled way b)t 
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reading. But very recently one proposal did actually survive. It was the proposal by ehe 
forrr1er n1e1nber, Ferrili.e Halsema, to lift some parts of the ban on constitutional review 
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